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ABSTRACT
The current crisis in international 'endingpoints up a lesson re—learned
several times in the past 150 years: the internationalloan markets function
very differently from the textbook model of competitivelending. This paper
discusses various extensions of the basic model.First, we amend the textbook
model to show how limitations on a government's
taxing authority may greatly
affect its optima]. borrowing strategy.Second, we explore the implications of a
debtor country's option to repudiate debt.Third, we show that efficient
lending may require collective actions by banksyndicates, and that a breakdown












The current crisis in internationallending points up a lesson re—learned
several times in the past 150years: the international loan markets function
very differently from the textbook model ofcompetitive lending. In the simple
model, borrowers have ready access to loans ata given interest rate; they enter
the loan market to finance allinvestment projects with positivepresent value
at the prevailing interestrate; and they use loans to equate themarginal
utility of consumption at various points intime. Actual lending behavior is
far from this rosy view. Borrowersare extensively rationed in the
international markets; theymay be unable to obtain credit at any price, much
less the posted market price.Highly profitable investment projectsmay be left
standing for want of foreign capital, orworse, may be abandoned mid-stream
after creditors withdraw capital ina sudden loss of confidence. Various
institutions, such as the IMF and the BIS, havean acknowledged role in
maintaining stability in the loan markets,even though such institutions are
superfluous in the simple model.
The large gap between theory andpractice has led to a search for new
theoretical concepts to explain actual loanbehavior. A number of recent models
have taken seriously the
possibility of debt repudiation (or "sovereign risk")
on loans to developing country
governments, and have shown that such a risk
radically alters the behavior of borrowers and lenders.The presence of
sovereign risk can help to explain creditrationing, debt re—scheduling,
conditionality, and even the maturity structure ofinternational obligations
(see [6], [17]). Other models (e.g., [19])have shown that credit
rationing may arise for other reasons as well, suchas when lenders cannot—2—
evaluate the risk categories of potential borrowers.Still other models (e.g.
[9])haveexplored the interaction of the domesticfinancial systems in
developing countries with international borrowing,to derive more useful policy
guidelines for international borrowing decisions.
These new models are helpful not only in restoringthe relevance of a
central class of economic models but also in shedding light onactual loan market
behavior. The theoretical advances can help us todefine the proper role of the
IMF in the present debt crisis, and of the banksand borrowing countries in a
very imperfect market.
This paper discusses some of the elements needed for aricher and more
realistic model of international lending to developing—countrygovernments. It
draws on recent work and offers some new results as well,aimed at highlighting
what is right and wrong with the standard modelsof international lending. The
textbook case is both insightful and a natural starting pointfor discussion.
It is treated in Section II of the paper. We then proceedto three areas of
that model, to show how more realistic assumptions canfundamentally alter our
views of borrower and lender behavior. The firstrevision comes in modelling
the borrowing country itself. The textbook casetreats the borrower as a
"representative agent" maximizing utility subjectto a budget constraint based
on national wealth (described below). Sincemost international borrowing is by
governments or government enterprises, thetextbook model implicitly assumes
thatgovernmentshave an unlimited taxing power over nationalwealth. We follow
Kharas [9]inintroducing a limit to the government's taxingauthority, and
show that optimal borrowing strategies maybequite different from standard—3—
prescriptions.In particular, governnent shouldno longer borrow in order to
finance all investment projects witha positive present value at world interest
rates. Such a strategy almost
surely leads to slow growth and a creditsqueeze.
The second extension to the textbookmodel comes in the assumption about
loan repayments. Standard modelsassume that loans are repaid as a longas
resources are available to repay them.Implicitly, the models assume that the
costs to a country of repudiating its
debts always outweigh the benefits. There
is no doubt that the costs of debt
repudiation are high, in both economic and
diplomatic terms. Nevertheless,governments have at times preferred unilateral
debt repudiation (or at leasta unilateral debt moratorium) to the arduousand
politically unpopular task of servicing aheavy debt burden, even when the debt
servicing was technically feasible.
In the middle third of thepaper, the textbook model is extended by giving
the borrower the option of debtrepudiation. The costs and benefits of debt
repudiation are made explicit, and all marketparticipants are assumed to
understand these costs and benefits. Anumber of important implicationsare
then derived. Most obviously, therepudiation risk leads to an upward—sloping
supply of funds to borrowing countries, and tocredit rationing once high levels
of indebtedness are reached. Lessintuitively, a number of inefficiencies arise
in the dynamic behavior of borrowingcountries, since the default risk distorts
several of the borrower's incentives. Debtorsmay be led to: (1) overborrow
period to period, relative to a path that wouldmaximize ex ante expected
utility; (2) over—invest in risky projects at theexpense of safe projects,
relative to a choice that would maximizeex ante utility; and (3) over—consume—4—
and under—invest relative to levels that wouldmaximize ex ante expected
utility.
The problems arise from the inability of borrowersto pre—commit themselves
to certain behavior once a loan is arranged. For example,a borrower might try
to convince lenders that it will act prudentially,and avoid overly risky
investments, in order to attract large loans at lowrates. The problem is that
after the loan is made, the borrower can oftenreduce the expected burden of the
debt by going ahead with the risky projects(or by over-borrowing, or
over—consuming, etc.). Since creditors anticipatethat these actions will in
fact be pursued, they charge a risk premium forthem in the original loan
contract. Not surprisingly, borrowers are bestoff when they can convincingly
foreswear these actions and thereby reducetheir initial cost of borrowing. In
domestic capital markets, bond covenants areused for that purpose. In the
international markets, convincing ways to foreswearsuch costly behavior have
yet to be found.
The third extension to the basic model involvesloan supply behavior. The
competitive loan model typically ignoresthe institutional structure of lending.
Credit is assumed to be supplied elastically at a giveninterest rate, and
little attention is paid as to whether that lendingcomes from a bank loan or a
bond flotation, a single lender or a syndicate,etc. In fact, the nature of
intermediation can be of profound importance.Inherent risk considerations
coupled with prudential bank lending ruleshave resulted in the syndication as
the preferred form of lending. A standardloan to a borrowing country may be
extended by several hundred participating banks.The problem with the—5—
syndicationis thatmemberbanks do not necessarily act in their collectivebest
interest when key contingencies arise, as wouldbe the case, for example, if the
loan were made by a single bank operating ina competitive environment.
Many actions that a syndicate should take have "publicgood" features to
them. For example, efficient loanpackages may require that banks monitor a
country's economic performance after a loan ismade, but the banks mayhaveno
way to share in the finance of that monitoring. Even if the needfor monitoring
is clear, each bank might try to be a free rideron the monitoring expenditures
of other banks. An insufficient amount ofmonitoring would result. More
importantly, an efficient loan package sometimes requires thatbanks re—finance
the debts of a heavily indebted country, at belowmarket rates, in order to keep
it from imminent default. Collectively, the needfor re—scheduling may be
clear, but once again each individual bank mighttry to withdraw its own credits
in order to leave the debt burden to the otherbanks.
The most dramatic breakdown of loan supplycomes in a panic, in which a
fundamentally sound economy is forced into default bya shortage of credit.
This type of market failure can result from therational behavior of a large
number of small lenders. Each bank rationally basesits loan supply decision
regarding a country on the actions of the other banks.Suppose, for example,
that a country needs a large loan to tide itover a short—run fall in income.
If all banks but one stop lending, only avery large loan from the remaining
bank may save the country from default. But sucha large loan maybeprecluded
by risk or regulatory considerations. Thus, if no other banksloan to the
country, the given bank mayalsochoose to stop loaning; whereas if the other—6—
banks were to continue their loans, the given bankcould safely contribute a
share of the total credit line. In these situations,two equilibria maybe
present. In the favorable case, all bankscontinue to lend; in a panic, all
banks stop lending, because the others have stopped lending,and the "healthy"
country finds itself forced into default.
There are several ways to overcome the collectiveaction problems of the
creditors, though none is costless or foolproof. Syndicatedloans typically
include loan managers, who provide public—good services,such as monitoring or
legal representation, in return for managementfees. Also, informal "fair
share" rules have emerged in the course of re—schedulings,in which various
burdens are divided on the basis of thebanks' existing shares in the total
loans to a re—scheduling country. Finally,institutions like the IMP (and to a
much lesser degree the BIS and leading centralbanks) assume some of the
public-good aspects of international lending,such as monitoring and enforcement
costs.
In the next sections, we illustrate theseconsiderations in a series of
models of international lending to a developing—countrysovereign borrower. The
models are kept simple to illustrate the main points asclearly as possible.
make no attempt at generality and little attemptat putting all of the various
models together. Each remains a single facet of anevolving general model.
Section II introduces the standard borrowing model,and Sections III, IV and V
consider the three major extensions of that model: imperfectionsin the
borrowing economy (Section ill); risks of debt repudiation(Section IV); and
collective—action problems of the creditors (Sectionv).-7-
II. The Basic Model of InternationalBorrowing
Consider the standard borrowing problem facinga social planner of a small
open economy (see [2], [3], [14] for examples). Theeconomy produces a pure traded
good in amount in period t, according to a production function =
F(Kt,Lt).
The labor supply is exogenous (or perfectly elasticwith a fixed wage w). The
capital stock evolves according to the equationKt+i =Kt(1_d)
+'t'where I is
gross investment and d is the rate of depreciation. In the closed
economy,
total spending (the sum of consumption and investment)is equal to output. In
the open economy, spending can be augmented byforeign borrowing. It is typical
to assume that the economy can engage inone-period international loans at given
world interest rates. LetDt+i be the stock of loans undertaken at time t for
re—payment at time t+1 ,andlet r be the real rate of interest on the loan (we
will simplify substantially and assume that r is fixedthrough time). With
national output given by national income (denoted by is given by net
of interest payments on debt coming due:'ft =— rDt.Total consumption in




The model is closed by specifying the terms ofborrowing. How much can the
borrower borrow? The standard assumption here is that theborrower can attract
any loan that can feasibly be paid back. The incentive to make thenecessary
loan repayments is simply assumed. In a finite—horizonversion of the model,
say T periods, it is also assumed that there is no last—period debt,80that



















By a simple set of manipulations wecanre—write(1)as:
T i. T (.\
(2) E (i+rY"1 1C. z(1+r)11(Q_I) —(1+r)D1
i=1 i=1
This equation implicitly defines an upper bound to borrowing. Note that
E (1+r)1_1) must be non—negative, since C. is non—negative. Therefore, by
i=1
1
bringing(1+r)D1 to the left—hand side of the inequality in(2) we find that:
T I.
(3) (1+r)D max(1+rY1h1(Q._I.)
1 . 11 I.i=1
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Equation(4) states a very important point:
In order for debt re—payment to be feasible, i.e. ,forDT+1 0,
indebtedness at any time must be less than national productive—9—
wealth, where the latter is defined as the maximumdiscounted
value of GDP net of investment in theremaining periods.
If the constraint in (4) is everstrictly binding, it implies that
consumption is zero along the entire remaining growthpath. For that reason
it is unlikely that an optimal borrowing
program involves borrowing Dt up to its
maximum feasible level. It is a simple matter totransform (4) to the appro-
priate expression for the infinite—horizon case.Feasibility conditions for
re-payment in that case are found simply by replacing T within (4):
() (1+r)Dtmax (1+rY(1t)(Q._I.) (Infinite-Horizon Case) I. i=t 1
Now, let us state the full borrowing problem.
(6) The Borrowing Problem in Finite Horizon











K1 ,D1 are given; Lt is given for all t
The infinite-horizon problem is foundsimply by substitutingfor T in (6).
This problem has been heavily explored, in variousguises, in the economics-10-
and planning literature, and in various degreesof sophistication. When stated
as in (6) ,theproblem results in the following necessaryconditions of
optimization.
(7) Optimal Borrowing in the Finite Horizon
The solution to (6) is a set of sequences jc1 ,C2,... ,CT}Il 1T-1 },and
{D1 ,...,DT}
that satisfy the conditions in (6) together with:
(a) U. =au/ac.
=X(1+r)
(b) aF/aK =r+dfor i =2,...,T—1
=1+r





Thereare three main conditions here. First(7)(a) states that the
international loan market should be used to equatethe marginal utility of
consumption in each period, U, with adiscounted marginal utility of wealth
X(1+r)1. Second, (7)(b) states that investmentsshould be undertaken in each
period (except the last) in order to equatethe marginal product of capital,
aF/BK with the cost of capital, r+d.Finally, (7)(c) holds that the
discounted value of total consumption equals thediscounted value of total
productive wealth net of initial indebtedness.We see from (2) that this
condition is equivalent to assuming that DT+1 =0.
The conditions (7)(a)—(c) are also propertiesof richer models, e.g., those—11—
that allow for productivity shocks orterms—of—trade fluctuations. When
carefully interpreted they describe many of the standardguidelines in the
development literature for foreign borrowing. Forexample, (7)(a) is really a
prescription to smooth consumption over time relative toincome, by borrowing
when output is low relative to trend andpaying back loans, on net, when output
is high. (See [14] and [16] for thisinterpretation). The country should
borrow in order to finance consumption
during a temporary drop in income, but
not during a permanent drop in the trend ofincome. On close analysis, (7)(a)
makes explicit the IMF dictum to financetemporary shocks, but "adjust" to per-
manent shocks.
Equation (7)(b) states the standard cost—benefitcondition for investment
projects in a small open economy. Regardless of theconsumption stream, the
planner should invest so as to equate themarginal product of capital, evaluated
at world market prices, with the cost ofcapital also at world market prices. A
nearly equivalent condition is that all projects should beundertaken with posi-
tive present value at the world marketprices and interest rates.
A useful simplification for solving theborrowing model is to write utility
as additively separable:
T
(8) u(c1 ,c2 ,...,CT)
=z u(C.)(i+S) 1
i=1
Thatis, total utility is the sum of sub—utilities basedon consumption in each
period. These sub—utilities are discounted according to thesubjective rate of—12—
preference, 6. With this formulation,(7)(a) becomes u =
thispoint forward, we will assume additive separability.
A second transformation is also helpful. Let V(Kt ,Dt)
of utility that a borrower can achieve startingwith Kt ,Dt.
plugging the solution from (6) into the utilityfunction.
or infinite horizon problem can bereduced to a two-period
problem. Thus, for example, the problemstated in (6) can







C = (t — rDt) — 't+ (Dt+i_Dt)
K1,D1 are given; Lt is givenfor all t






III. International Borrowing with DomesticFinancial Constraints
We now expand the model to allow for an explicitrole for public—sector
time
From





financial variables. For simplicitywe illustrate our results in the three—
period version of the model just introduced.
Kharas [9], Katz [8], and others havepointed out that the pure
borrowing model should differentiate between theprivate and public sectors and
take seriously the empirical fact that mostinternational lending to developing
countries is to the public sector, or to theprivate sector with public—sector
guarantees. In these circumstances, debt—servicing
capacity depends not only on
national wealth but on the public sector'sability to tax that wealth.
Moreover, domestic capital markets in the borrowingcountry tend to be highly
segmented and imperfect so that the public sector mustuse its borrowing powers
to bring about an efficient level ofaggregate investment in the economy.
Thus, let us suppose that the private sector in thedeveloping country
saves a fixed fraction of post—tax income, which isavailable for private
investment, while the government uses its taxing andborrowing authority to
supplement private investment and/or privateconsumption (see Arrow and Kurz
[i], Ch. VI, for a similarset—up in a closed economy). Private investors
have no direct access to the international loanmarket. The government taxes
domestic output at rateTt, which may change over time. This rate must be less
than 1.0, and may be less than zero if thegovernment is making net income
transfers to the private sector.
With domestic output given by tax revenues are TtQt, and private Lector
savings are s(1_tt)Qt. Private consumption is given byC =(1_8)(1_Tt)Qt.In
any period, the government borrows Dt+i and repays (1+r)Dt. Totalinvestment in
the economy is given by:-14-
Its(l_Tt)Qt +TtQt
+(Dt+i_(1+r)Dt)
(private (tax (net foreign
savings) revenue) resource
inflow)
As written, it appears that all foreign borrowing is usedfor investment rather
than consumption, but this is true only as an accounting matter. Suppose ,for
example, that the government wants to raise privateconsumption while holding
investment levels fixed. It merely raises Dt+i while reducing Tsufficiently
to keep I. constant; in that case the borrowing finances consumption100% on the
margin.
Now, let us calculate the optimal financial policyof the government,
assuming again that it tries to maximize an intertemporalutility function of
the form u(C1) +u(C2)/(1+&)
+v(K3,D3)/(1+ô)2.














As long as tax rates arecompletely flexible, the solution to thisproblem is
identical to the social planner's solutionof the earlier section, since the
dynamic budget constraint facing thegovernment is no different whether it
chooses and as before or Tt and 1 as here.
To show this formally, simplysubstitute for C1,C2,K and in the
utility function in (10),tofind:1
u=
u[(1-5)(1-T1)F(K1)] + u[(1-9)(1-t2)p(K1(1_d) + i)J/(i+)
+


























Bysubstituting (11)(a),(b),(d) into (11)(c), wefindthat FK(K2) =r+d,as
before; the conditions (11)(a) ,(b) and (d)are exactly as before. Thus, the
demonstration is complete.
To find the tax rates implied by (ii),note that C =(1—s)(1—t.)p(K.,),so
that 1—[C./F(K)][t/(1...5)]. A typicaloptimal growth path for a developing—16—
economy will involve a rising r. Low tax ratesin the early period allow
households to benefit early on from the growth that will beachieved in
periods 2 and 3. Higher taxes later on are necessaryto service the
international debt.
Now let US introduce a simple yet crucial hitch into the model. Suppose
that the government can only raise tax rates to a limitr < 1 ,andthat the
constraint is binding in the sense that the optimal Ti and/or t2 exceeds i.
The first effect of the tax ceiling is to tighten significantlythe feasibility
con8traint derived earlier in (4). Debt repayment now depends on taxing
authority as well as national wealth. The new constraintis that Dt must be
less than or equal to the maximum level of tax revenues netof government







It is more likely that (4') holds as a binding constraintthan (4), since (4')
does not imply that future consumption must equal zero whenthe constraint
binds. Nonetheless, in the examples that follow, we do notconsider the
binding case. We focus rather on the binding constraint T,assuming
Dt remains below its maximumlevel.
Since the optimal tax path tends to involve rising r, anatural case to
consider is one in which the tax constraint does not bind in period1 while it
does bind in period 2. We consider that case first. By theKuhn—Tucker
conditions for optimization we know that U/t1 0, with thestrict inequality-17-
holding when is binding at the constraint .Thus,when < r and =
3U/3T1
=0and au/ar2>0. What are the implications of thetax constraint?
From (11)(b),u2< _vD/(1+). The secondperiodmarginal utility of consumption
is "too low." The government wouldlike to raise second—periodtaxes, reduce
C2 and thereby raise u2, but it has already taxedto the limit. Let 8 be such
that u2(1+O) =_VD/(1+t)(clearly 8 must be positive).Substituting this
relationship and (11)(d) into (11)(c) we see that:
(12) FK(K2) =(r+d)•y
=(1+e)4(i+o) — O(l—s)(1—)j > 1
Wehave the key result:
Undera regime of constrained tax levies, themarginal product of
capital should no longer be equated with theworld market cost of
capital but rather should be kept gher, toreflect a lower
shadow value of second—period output.
The utility value of second-periodoutput may be measured byu2. Since this is no
longer equated to VD/(1+), second—periodreturns to investment should begiven
a weight less than 1.0 in project
analysis. By following the standard rule
FK(K2) =r+d,the country is led to over—borrow,with the result that social
welfare is reduced.
Let us consider a graphic case of thisissue that follows the analysis in
Kharas [J.Supposethat the government only cares about£rowth, in the
sense that u(C1)




trying to maximize third—period nationalincome (net of international
indebtedness). If is not constrained, r1 and 12 should be setat 1.0, with
government revenue plus net foreign borrowingused to equate FK(K2) with r +d,
according to the classic policy prescription.
Now suppose that T <1. Since consumption has no weight in
utility, it is optimal to set taxes at theirmaximum rate: = r.Then,
D3 and 1(3 are given by:
D3
=(1+r)ji1 -[s(1-)+JF(K1)}+-[s(1-)+ ]F(K1 (1-d) + I) }
1(3
=
K1(1-d)2+ 11(1-d) + 12
By setting V/3I1 =all/al2
=0,we find the optimal investment policy.After
somealgebra, we find:
(13) FK(K2)
(r+d) > r + d; FK(K )= (r+d)
s(1—r)+
Onceagain, the country should not invest enoughto equate and r +d.
To understand (13) ,considerhow a foreign—financed, fr-change in I affects
third—period income (that is all that countsto the government!). raises
1(3 by (1—d)A11 ,andso F(K3) equals FK(K3) •(1—d)tI1.
Since F1((K3) is chosen
to equal (1+r) ,F(K3)
=(1+r)(1—d).I1.
affects third—period debt in a
number of ways: second—period taxes rise by FK(K2)AIl;second—period savings
rise by s(1—)F1((K2)AI1; andsecond—perioddebt rises by (1+r)A11. Thus,






Atthe optimum, F(K3) isequated to A(1+r)D3. This conditionimmediately
yields (13).
This model provides apowerful indictment against foreignborrowing, even
for productiy investmentrojif the domestic fiscalsystem is not
equipped to handle rising debt—service
ratios. Figure 1 illustrates how
aggregate growth is slowed by excessiveborrowing in a tax-constrainedregime,
for specific parameter valuesof the model. In the unconstrained
regime,
optimal borrowing is at D; in theconstrained case, with a lowr, the optimum
is at D* < D; and in theconstrained case with a hight, the optimum is at D*.
Iv. International Borrowingwith Possible Debt Repudiation
So far, the creditors haveonly considered the feasibilit1 of debt
repayment in setting debt ceilings for the
borrowing country. In practice,
however, a loan must pass two hurdlesto make it a reasonable bet: (i)it must
be feasible for the loan topaid off; and (2) the borrower must havethe
incentive to pay off the loan whenit comes due. In some cases itmaybeless
onerous for a borrower to repudiate
a debt obligation, and accept thepenalties
that may arise, than to undertakethe task of paying off the debt.In this
section we Study how the creditorsand borrowers operate when sucha possibility
exists.
A word concerning terminology isuseful at this point. In technicalterms,
a default is any failure torespect the terms of a loan agreement. Adefaultgrowth





Firs t-Pe nod Borrowing-20-
may occur because Dt is mistakenly allowed torise above productive wealth;or
because the government is unable tolevy the necessary taxes to service the
debt; or, as we shall see in SectionV, because the creditors panic and createa
liquidity shortage for the borrowingcountry. In this section we analyze the
possibility of defaults caused purely by the choice ofthe borrowing—country
government in a situation in which debtrepayment is feasible but perhaps
unpleasant. For this type of default we followEaton and Gersovitz [6] in
reserving the term "debt repudiation."
A. The Basic Model of Debt Repudiation
The key to modelling debt repudiation isan explicit assumption
regarding its benefits and costs. The benefitsare straightforward: the
borrower saves the real value of theoutstanding debt, which it no longer
services. The costs are far moreproblematic, to judge from historical
experience (see [15]). One aspect of the costs isa partial or complete
inability to obtain new loans in the worldcapital markets, at least for some
time after the repudiation occurs. Anotheraspect of the cost may be a direct
seizure of the country's overseas
assets, including bank accounts, direct
foreign investments, ships and aircraft. Athird, and even more important cost,
may be a dramatic decline in the country's
capacity to engage in trade, even if
no net new borrowing is involved. Modern tradeis built on a sophisticated
system of revolving trade credits. Even ifa country's net debt is zero, its
gross stocks of trade—related financial assets andliabilities are likely to be
large. Because a borrower would havedifficulty in arranging trade credits—21—
after a repudiation, the mechanics of trade would bemade onerous. Moreover,
merchandise at ports ready to be dispatched to the debtor countrycould be
subject to seizure by the creditors.
To introduce these elements, we assume that when adebt is repudiated the
creditors retaliate by imposing two costs: in all future periods,the
borrower's production is reduced, for given K and L, by a fixedfraction A; and
second, the borrower is excluded from all further borrowing.Importantly, we
assume that this retaliation yields neither costs norbenefits to the creditors
(or that the costs and benefits cancel).
As an easy start, we begin with a two-period versionof the international
borrowing model (we simply drop V(K3,D3)). The taxconsiderations are ignored,
so that we implicitly assume that domestic taxlevies are not constrained.
Loans are made to the sovereign borrower in period 1.If they are not repaid in
period 2, the penalty is enforced and second—period outputis reduced by AQ2.
The borrower makes the repudiation decision in thesecond period (there is no
way that it can pre—cornmit itselfto a decision before the second period
arrives). Since second—period utility is simply u(C2) ,theborrower compares





(We denote this level as c.) With no repudiation,
C2 equals Q2— (1+r2)D2,which we denote C. The borrower defaults whenever
C exceeds C, and thus whenever (1+r2)D2 < XQ2. Note that theinterest rate
has a time—subscript; we can no longer assume a uniqueworld interest rate for all
loans, since creditors will now impose a risk premiumto allow for default risk.
There are two choices with respect to the timing ofloans. The level of-22—
credit D2 may be extended beforeor after the investment decisionI is made.
We shall see shortly that it is a greatadvantage to the country to be able to
choose before going to the capital markets, sinceI may then be chosen to
make the credit terms on a given loanmore favorable, or to increase the total
amount that the country can borrow. Amore natural assumption, however, is that
loans are arranged first and that thegovernment then allocates them to
consumption and investment. This is more natural because thegovernment will
generally have an incentive to renege on a promised level ofI once a loan is
arranged, even if ex ante it would be better off to fix theI initially. Thus,
promises concerning I will be Unconvincing. We term thecase in which is
set first the "pre—comxnitment" equilibrium, andregard the other case as the
"standard" assumption.
The trick to solving the borrowing problem undercertainty is to calculate
the loan supply ceilingD2, beyond which the creditors will not make loans. As
long as D2 is less than or equal toD2, the country will choose not to default.
The loan will be safe, and the interest rate willequal the safe rate of
interest, denoted by p. For > D2, the country will default for interest
rate greater than or equal to p. No riskpremium can compensate for the
certainty of debt repudiation. All lending is cut off at thepoint
In order to find D2, we first
compute the country's investment choice as
a function of D2. For each D2, we find the level ofutility of the borrowing
country for alternative values of I,andchoose the optimal I as a function
of D2. We thereby deriveI =11(D2).The borrowing ceiling D2 is found as the








It remains to calculate 11(D2). Note that the borrowerdefaults if and
only if XF[K1(1—d) +i]
> (1+p)D2. Thus, for each D2 there is a threshhold
I for which the country defaultsif and only if I < I. To find the best
investment policy for given D2, the country makes twocalculations: its best
utility if it heads for default (i.e., with I < I1), orif it plans to repay
its debt (i.e., with I I). It then picks the strategywhich yields the
higher utility. Thus:
(15) 11(D2) is given as the solution to max(uB, UN)
Ii









Armed with the investment function, (14) maybesolved for D2.
Once2 is known, the borrower's problemis easily specified.






C2 = — (l—p)D2;Q2 =F(K)




y =0for D <
y > 0 for D =
Theinterpretation is as follows. If the credit ceiling is notbinding, we are
back to the textbook model. Marginal utility of incomesare equated over time
with u1/[u2/(1+,5)] equal to (1+p). Investmentsare carried out to the point
where the marginal product of capital equals the worldinterest rate. (Note
that in the two—period model, this meansFK(K2) =1+p,rather than
FK(K2) =r+das in the three—period model.) When the credit ceiling binds, it
is as if the domestic interest, rate exceeds the worldmarket rate. Less
investments areundertaken,since the marginal product of capital must nowequal
the higher rate 1 +p+y.u1 (c1) rises relative to u2(C2) ,meaningthat the
consumption path is pushed into the future.
As A (the default penalty) rises, D2 risesas well, and the credit is more
easily obtained. Utility rises, and investment andC1 increase as well. Thus,
in a world of certainty, borrowers prefer higherpenalties for debt repudiation.
The higher the penalty, the easier are the credit conditions.
Now let us modify the model by allowing thecountry to pre—comxnit to
I before D1 is selected. The borrower's problem becomes:—25—












Borrowersnow set I knowing that their choice influences thesize of loans that
they can hope to arrange ,sincecreditors restrict (1+p)D2 to be less than or
equal to XQ2. Implicitly there is a non—linear constraint on C1and I ,such
that (1+p)(C1+11—Q1) XF[(1—d)K1 +i1j.
The solution to the pre—cornrnitinent
problem is:





0 =0forD2(1+p) > XQ
o > 0forD2(1+p) =AQ2
Once again, when 0 =0,we are back to an unconstrained optimum, with u1/u2=
(i+p)/(i+ô)and FK(K2) =(l+p).When 0 > 0, we are again in a situation where
should be held above the world cost of capital, as should theratio of u1 to
u2/(l+6). A key point here, relative tothe "standard case" in (17) ,isthat
is now set below u1/[u2/(1+6)J. That is because there are nowtwo benefits of—26—
investment: higher second—periodincome, and a relaxation of theborrowing
constraint. The first motive for
investment (second—period consumption)
generally leads the planner to equate
FK with u1/[u2/(1+5)]. The second con-
sideration raises investment, and thuslowers FK relative tou1/Lu2/(i+5)j.
In general, pre—commitmentresults in a higher level ofI ,greaterdebt,
and higher utility. Theutility level must be greater than orequal to utility
in the "standard" case, since thepolicy—maker in (18) could choose topre—cominit
at the equilibrium level in thestandard solution. Wesee, then, that
pre—coinmiting one's country to a high investmentprofile is a method of enhancing
credit—worthiness and raising social welfare.Of course, we should not lose
sight of the previous section's conclusion
that a weak public finance structure
may militate against extensive foreignborrowing for investment purposes.
A linear model offers a vividillustration of the effects ofrepudiation
risk, and of investment pre-colnmjtment.Let:
(20) Q1 =
=+ (i+y)i ,i I
U= C1 + C2/(1+rS)
6>1>
Thus,there we assume a quantity I of
investment projects with a rate ofreturn
yexceeding the world interest ratep. The rate of time discount 6 is also
assumed to be greater than the worldinterest rate. In the textbookmodel, the
borrowing equilibrium involvesI = (eli. investment projectsundertaken)), with
consumption shifted entirely to the firstperiod, and no consumption in the—27—
second(since 6 > p with linear utility). In sum:










Now,we turn to the "standard" repudiation model.For any given D2,
I will be chosen to equal zero, since6 > .ThereforeQ2 =Q,and the debt
ceiling is given by D2 =AQ/(1+p).The complete solution is:







Thus, the risk of repudiation reduces D2, I ,andC ,andraises C2.
Finally, we have the pre—commitiuent case. Inthis model, the borrowing
country will choose to pre—coinniit to I. =Iwhen -y is close to 6, and when 6 is
much greater than p. Specifically we find:
(23) The Pre—Coinmitment Repudiation Case-28-
C1 =Q+D
—Ii
I =0for (ô—p)x(1+-y) < (6—y)(1+p)
I = for (-p)x(1+y) > (ó-'y)(l+p)
C2 = — AQ
D2 AQ2/(1+p)
Thus, the pre—commitrnent case be the sameasthe no—pre—coinmjtrnent case
butmight(and generally will) result in an equilibrium somewhere betweenthe
textbook model and the standard repudiation model. Pre—commitment allowsgreater
borrowing, greater investment in profitable projects, and higherfirst—period
consumption.
B.The Debt Repudiation Model Under Uncertainty
So far, an actual default never occurs in the model, though the threatof
default hasaprofound effect on economic welfare and the nature of macroeconomic
equilibrium. Once uncertainty is introduced into the model, debt repudiations
willactually occur as random events. The presence of uncertainty has
severaleffects. First, the loan supply schedule becomes upwardsloping, rather
than perfectly elastic up to a maximum debt level 15.Second, and even more
important, the incentive structure for macroeconomic managementmay become
perverse, in ways soon to be described. A more complete treatment of debt
repudiation under uncertainty may be found in L6iand[17j.Here, we will
discuss some simple yet revealing examples.
Consider the linear model just described, but with I =0and Q2 a random
variable, equal towith probability II and OQ (o<1) with probability (i—n).-29-
We assume II > 8, which proves convenient below. Creditors are assumed to be
risk—neutral, charging an interest rate r2 that yields an expected rate of
return equal to p (we relax the assumption of risk neutrality in the next
section). Debtors are assumed to repudiate debt whenever (1+r2)D2 > AQ, and to
repay debt otherwise.
Let us specify the loan supply schedule. Let a be the probability of a
debt repudiation. The interest rate r2 will be set so that (1+r2)(1—a) =(1+p)
assuming risk neutral creditors. By using the relations (1+r2)(1—a) =(1+p)and





r =(p+fl)/(1—fl)for e2D2 < D
The supply schedule is shown in Figure 2, where we see an important point.
Though the loan supply is upward sloping (in this case a step function) ,there
5stilla point 2 above which higher risk-premia do not compensate for
repudiation risk. Creditors will not extend loans beyond D2, at interest
rate. Thus ,evenin more general models, there tend to be credit ceilings,
rather than ever-higher risk premia, as a property of the loan supply schedule.
Now, suppose that the social welfare function is U =C1
+C2/(1+6)
,andthe
goal of the government is to maximize expected utility, E(U). Since we are
ignoring investment, the only issue is how much to borrow, with C1 =+ D2,and-30-
C2max —
(i+r2)D2,(1—A)Q2). A little algebra yields the following rules:
(25) For< p, the country lendsD2 =
—Q1
For p < S < [0(1—ri) +rrp(1—o)J/(ri_e),the country borrows
D2 =AO/(1+fl)at interest rate II, and with zeroprobability of
debt repudiation.
For c < Le(i—n)+ri(i_o)j<,thecountryborrows =atinterest
rate r =(p+rr)/(1—ri), andwith probability (i—ri) of debt repudiation.
Thus, the more "impatient" the country, i.e., thegreater is 5, the higher is
the borrowing, which comes at a greater costand a greater risk of default.
There is a simple, yet important lesson in (25).The probability of debt
repudiation does not depend on A but rather oncomparisons of and p. Higher
penalties (A) do not necessarily reduce thefrequency of debt repudiation. In a
more general model, a rise in A mightactually raise that frequency! The reason
is that while higher A makes defaultmore costly, it also makes lenders willing
to extend more credit. Thus, when A rises boththe costs and benefits of debt
repudiation increase, and in the example, theprobability of debt repudiation
remains unchanged.
C.Debt Repudiation and Macroeconomic Incentives
A recent theme of financial economics is that thevarious claimants on a
firm's income stream (e.g., theshareholders, bondholders, workers) have




Figure2. Loan Supply Schedule Under RepudiationRisk
1—31—
affect the relative valuation of thedifferent claims. Thus, the shareholders
may urge policies that raise shareholder wealth atthe expense of bondholder
wealth, as described in [7], [13], and [ia].Or coalitions of the shareholders
and banks may engage in policies atthe expense of bondholders,especially in
the context of bankruptcy actions (see [4]).A notable feature of these
examples is that the firm may pursue inefficientpolicies that reduce the
overall value of the firm, becausesome groups will benefit even though other
groups will be hurt more.
A related theme is that allgroups are generally left better off, exante,
if the firm can be constrained from
pursuing inefficient policies. As an
example, consider the case of risky investments.it is well known that
shareholders can sometimes devalue theclaims of bondholders on the firmby
selecting overly risky investment projects. (Abond is an option on the firm's
income stream; an increase in variance ofan income stream reduces the value of
the related option.) Since bondholdersknow this, exante, theymay charge a
high risk premium in anticipation of the
investment policy. This high risk
premium reduces shareholder wealth while itallows the bondholder to earn the
expected market rate of return. After the loanis made and the risky investment
selected, the bond claim is reduced in value (relativeto the hypothetical value
if a safe investment is insteadselected) ,butthe initial risk premium has
already compensated for that effect. If theshareholders could have somehow
committed themselves to choose safeinvestments, the initial high risk premium
could have been avoided, to theirown advantage.
Several direct analogies can be made tomacroeconomic behavior by the-32—
borrowingcountry. Like a firm, the country also has variousclaimants on the
income stream, including the government, domestic citizens, andinternational
creditors. And like the firm, the country may be led to selectinefficient
policies to transfer income from the creditors tothe "shareholders" (the
government and domestic private sector). Generally, the countrywould like to
foreswear these policies ex ante but may find it difficult to do so.
Let us consider an example in the linear stochastic framework, also
involving the riskiness of investment projects. Suppose thatthere are two
options for an investment project. Option A yields Q2
=(1+1A)11with
certain. Option B yields Q2 =(1+1B)11with probability TI, and Q2 =0with
probability 1—fl. The yield on A is/,andthe expected yield on B is
We will assume that isgreaterthan 11(1+1B)_1. The government
borrowsto finance I. ,sothat D2 =.Second—periodconsumption equals
—(1+r)Dif there is no default, and (1—x)Q2ifthere is a default.
Default occurs if and only if (1+r2)D2 > XQ. We also assume that (1+r2)is
lessthan X(i+YA) and
Nowsuppose that social welfare is simply the expectedvalue of C2, E(C2).
Which investment project should be selected? If the investment projectis
selected before the loan is made, it is easy to check that optionA is
preferred. Under option A, the borrowing rate is simply p,since there is
zero probability of default. E(C) is simply (l÷yA)11 —(1+p)11.Under option B,
default occurs with the "bad" outcome, which occurs with probability(1—n). The
borrowing rate equates ]i(1+r2) with (1+p). EC =11(1+1B)11
—(1+p)11.By
assumption, 11(1+B) < (i+yA), soEC < EC.
Ifthe loan is made before the investment project is selected, the country—33-
maywell choose B instead of A! To see theproblem, suppose that the banks
lend =Iat rate p in anticipation that option A will be selected.At rate
p, EC (_p)i1 ,asbefore, while EC now equals 11(1B_)1 As long as
> n(i+) > (i+) -(1+p)(1-),EC > EC. Since the creditors will
recognize the country's expost incentive to choose B, the loan willin fact
carry the interest rate r2 such that ll(1+r2) =1+p,and project B will again
be preferred.
The problem here is as follows. When the investmentproject is chosen
first, the borrower must consider the effect of his investmentchoice on the
terms of the loan. When the loan is arrangedfirst, the borrower does not
consider this effect, since the termsofthe loan arealreadyset. The borrower
would like to promise the creditor that the safeproject will be pursued, but
such a promise will look unconvincing given the incentiveto renege on it once
the loan agreement is set.
There are several other areas of behavior in whichtiming and default risk
interact to produce bad macroeconomic choices. Theearlier discussion of
investment pre-commitment can be thought ofprecisely in these terms. From an
ex ante point of view it is beetforthe country to choose a high level of
investment, because highinvestmentrelaxes credit ceilings. However, once a
loan package is arranged, the country prefers to raisefirst-period consumption
at the expense of investment. Since creditors understandthis, they will tend
to discount initial promises of high investmentplans, and indeed they will be
right.
A similar phenomenon occurs when countries borrowwith long-term debt.-34-
When a country owes long-term debt, each new amount of borrowing tends to reduce
the expected value of the original debt by making eventual its repudiation more
likely. In many cases, the borrowing country would like to be able to promise a
potential long—term creditor that it will not over—borrow once the long—term
debt is arranged. Such a promise would reduce the risk premium on the long—term
debt. However, there will generally be strong incentives, ex post, to do
precisely the contrary. The result is, in general, that long—term debt will
command a high risk premium and that, as expected, over-borrowing will occur.
Market participants search for ways to reduce these deleterious incentives.
It may be the case that countries can establish reputations for maintaining
macroeconomic policies in line with announced plans. There is a growing
economics literature on establishing a reputation (e.g., [ii]) that may well
give some insights in this direction. Other specific actions, such as relying
on short-term borrowing rather than long-term borrowing, may reduce some of the
incentive problems. In domestic capital markets, and to a much smaller extent
in international lending, bond covenants can be used to pre—coinmit the borrower
to a future line of action. Smith and Warner [18] provide an excellent survey
of such covenants, which indicate how they help to enforce an efficient
borrowing and investment plan by corporate borrowers. For example, covenants
often directly restrict dividend payments, which may be tantamount to requiring
the shareholders to invest rather than "consume" their loans. Other types of
provisions include restrictions on new borrowing, maintenance of the firm's
existing assets, financial disclosure requirements, and restrictions on merger
activity. Such provisions are typically unenforceable with foreign sovereign—35.-
borrowers and thus are not part of the most syndicated loanagreements.
V. Collective Action Problems in Syndicated Lending
The problems with the textbook model haveso far all involved the borrower
(whether in its tax system, or its incentive torepudiate debt). Problems at
least as serious can arise on the creditorside, especially when credit market
imperfections interact with the problems already identified. Wehave so far
treated the creditor side as a "black box"operation, extending loans that yield
the appropriate rate of return. In fact,on a typical loan, the creditor side
tends to be composed of a large number of financialintermediaries who join
together as a syndicate on an ad hoc basis. While thesyndication process helps
in risk diversification, it leads to several otherproblems of great
significance.
Our amended model of the supply side posits avery large number of banks,
each with an upward sloping schedule of loansupplies to the borrowing country.
Let Er be the expected returnon a loan made to the country by bank(the
expectation takes account of risks of debt repudiation,insolvency, etc.). Let
L be the amount of the bank's total lending to the country, andB be total
bank capital. The main hypothesis is that the inverse loansupply schedule
takes the form:
(26) Er =p+F(L./B.) f(O) =0
f'(.) >
According to (26), banks demand an expected return close top when the country—36—
loansconstitute a small fraction of bank capital but demand a higher expected
return as the loans constitute a growing fraction of bank capital.There may
even be a cut-off point ).suchthat L./B 2..According to American banking
law, for example, no bank may allocate more than 10 percentof bank capital to
a single borrower. While there are many technical waysaround such ceilings,
these ceilings seem also to be self—imposed by banks.
The loan supply schedule in (26) provides a powerful incentivefor loan
diversification among a large number of creditors. If a single bankmakes a
loan of size L =L/B,the country pays expected return E(r) =p+
Ifthe same loan is equally divided among N banks, the rate is
E(rT) =p+f(9../N)< p +f(2).Indeed, as N +, thecost of borrowing
approaches p, and the loan supply schedule mimics that ofthe risk-neutral
creditors of earlier models.
A loan supply schedule like (26) can be derived from the utility
maximization of risk-averse banks, via a CAPM approach. Suppose,for example,
that expected utility (to bank-managers) of the bank portfoliois given by
E(r) —2(r'),wherer is the return on the overall bank portfolio. It is
simple to show that the expected return on the countryloan must satisfy
LP
Er) —p=cov(r,r).
In general, as L/B increases, the covariance of
and r also rises, so that the bank requires a higher risk premium onits
loans.
The assumption of risk—averse banks requires some justification.Standard
finance theory holds that under certain conditions firmsshould ignore own-risk
in choosing policies, since shareholders can diversify whatever specificrisk—37-
the firm undertakes. However, these conditions are extremely restrictive and
more general conditions lead to risk—averse behavior. For example, serial costs
of bankruptcy mean that firm valuation will depend on own risk. Also with
imperfect monitoring of managerial decisions by the shareholders, firm decisions
will tend to involve risk—averse behavior. And in the context of commercial
banks, bank regulators impose portfolio requirements limiting risk. Such
policies are necessary in light of the moral hazards engendered by official
deposit insurance programs in the U.S. ,Western Europe, and Japan.
A. The Possibility of Panics
The same drive towards diversification also gives rise to thepossibility
of liquidity crisis or panic in international lending. Consider thefollowing
example. Suppose that a country has debt obligations due in the first period
equal to (1+r1)D1; current income Q1lessthan (1+r1)D1; and stochastic second—
period income given by Q2= Q withprobability 11 and =0with probability
1 —IT.We assume further that the existing debt D1 is held by a large number of
creditors who do not act as a unified group engaged in negotiation with the
debtor country (more on this below),andwhose individual holdings are too small
to give rise to any individual bargaining with the debtor country.
There are a number of possibilities at hand. Consider first the standard
assumption that all debt is highly diversified among the creditors, so that
E(r) =pfor all banks i, and for all periods. Since the country cannot
feasibly repay (i +r1)D1 out of current income, it must borrow
D2 (1+r1)D1 —Q1. Newloans must be at least at interest rater2 such that
II(1+r2) 1 +pin order to satisfy the new creditors. Thus,(1+r2) =(1+p)/ll.-38-
Now,
(27) If < (1+p)I.(1+r1 )D1—Q1 i/Ti
the country will be forced into default on grounds of negative net
worth (insolvency);
If X < (1+p)[(1+r1)D1 —Q1j/fl,
the country will be forced into
default on the grounds that repudiation risk precludes new loans
in spite of overall solvency;
If X > (1+p)(1+r1)D1 —Q1]/iI,thecountry can obtain new loans on a
competitive basis.
A liquidity crisis, as distinct from a solveny or repudiation crisis
occurs when the last condition in (27) is satisfied but the countryis
nevertheless unable to obtain the requisite loans. The surprising result is
that such an outcome can occur in competitive equilibrium. Assume that all
banks lend according to (26) ,andtake as given the amount of loans extended by
the other banks. If all banks suddenly expect all other banks to stop
lending to the country, it will be rational for certain parametervalues for
each bank to stop lending as well on the basis of that expectation, with the
result that it becomes self—confirming. To see this, consider a single bank
planning its loans under the assumption of no loans from otherbanks. The bank
knows that unless it loans D2 =(1+r1)D1
—
Q1,thecountry will default.
According to (26) ,aloan of size D2 requires an expected rate of return
E(r) =p+f(D2/B).
Since the debtor can only hope to be paid off with
probability II in the second period, the interest rate r2 on the loan mustat—39—
least be such that ll(l+r2) =1+p+f(D2/B).
A liquidity crisis can arise when the following condition holds:




In this case, it is safe for many banks to lend D2, but not safe for any single
bank to lend at all. The risk premium required for single-bank lending is
enough to push the country to debt repudiation in the next period, with
(i+r2)D2 > AQ. If all banks believe that all other banks will stop lending,
that outcome will in therefore occur.
Note that a panic requires a fairly high level of initial debt. Let
r (D2) be the loan supply schedule for a single debt. Then, a panic requires
Li +r(D2)jD2> XQ. Clearly, there exists a Dn, for which D2 D1 a
panic is impossible and D2 > a panic can occur. Since D2 equals
(1+r1)D1 —Q1
,thereis similarly a condition for (1+r1)D1. Figure 3 shows the
individual banks loan supply schedule; forD2 > D1T', r is such that
(1r2)D2 > Q. It is precisely because panics occur only at high levels of debt
that they are so difficult to distinguish from other forms of default. In every
true liquidity crisis, it will seem to some observers that the problem really
lies with the risk of debt repudiation or insolvency, rather than with the
supply of credit.
A good historical candidate for a liquidity crisis is cited in L15i (also-40•-
see Iioj). In mid—1930, the international bond markets "shut down" to the
developing countries. While about $411 million of non—Canadian debt was floated
from January to July, 1930, only $5 million was floated during the rest of the
year. It was six months after the bond market collapsed that the first country
(Bolivia) defaulted. Remarkably, much of the panic can be traced to a single
week when a military coup in Brazil caused bond prices to plummet. Some
representative bond prices for that week are shown in the table below.




Argentina 6s 95 54 i/s
Bolivia 8s 76 3/Li 66
Brazil 6 1/28 73 48 1/2
Chile 6s 83 1/2 71
Columbia 6s 66 5/8 58
Uruguay 101 88
Source: Financial Chronicle, vol. 131, p. 2264, 1930, reported in [is].
B.Other Collective Action Problems
A financial panic is not the only case in which cooperation among creditors
can improve the efficiency of the international loan markets. In general, loan—41—
contracts can be made more efficient if the creditors are able to act
collectively under certain contingencies. For example, an efficient loan
contract may require that existing creditors re—schedule the debts of the
borrower at below—market rates in order to avoid a default. If the creditors
are widely dispersed, without an institutional structure to enforce collective
action, it may be impossible to arrange the re-scheduling. No creditor alone
has incentive to re-schedule at below—market rates, while each creditor hasan
incentive to free ride (by demanding full repayment of his claims) if the others
re—schedule. This seems to be the historical experience with international
lending in the bond market.
When creditors are better organized, as in syndicated bank loans, there is
at least the possibility that mutually advantageous collective action can be
arranged. We will cite evidence below, however, that even in bank syndicates
significant free—rider problems remain.
Let us illustrate the role for collective action by considering a simple
numerical example in the three—period borrowing model. We willassumethat
is fixed at Q,whileQ2and
Q3mayequalQ(probability orzero
(probability Q2and are assumed to be independently distributed. We
assume that the country defaults only when it runs out of cash (i.e. it never
voluntarily repudiates its debt). The safe interest rate is 0.10, and creditors are
are risk-neutral.
The borrower is interested in maximizing C1,whichequals Q1+ D,so that
equivalently, he is interested in maximizing first—period loans. Now, we
compare two types of loan contracts. In the first case, the loan D2 is madeby—42-
a large number of creditors without organizational cohesion. If =0,the
borrower must trytoborrow again on market terms, in order to repay (1r2)D2.
If he cannot attract new loans, he defaults. In the second case, a cohesive
syndicate is formed. If =0,the borrower must first try to borrow again on
market terms. If he cannot attract new loans, the syndicate guarantees that the
borrower can roll—over the credit at the initial interest rate.
The borrower will be able to borrow more, at better terms, under the
syndicate arrangement. First, we calculate the loan supply schedule in the case
without syndication. It turns out that for 0 (D2/2.42, the lenders can
lend at the safe interest rate of 10 percent. If turns out to equal zero,
borrowers will be able to attract the necessary new loans to pay off the
existing debt. The new loan D3 will equal 1.1 D2, with interest rate
=1.2(= (1.1/2)—1).For Q/2.42 < D Q/2.2, the interest rate r2 is
1.2. If Q2 =0,the country will default, since it will not be able to attract
new loans at market terms. /2.2 is the loan ceiling.
In the syndicate, loans 0 'Z D2Q/2.42 will also be made at the 10 percent
rate, for the reasons above. For /2.42 < D2Q/1 .85, the interest rate will
equal 0.36. The syndicate will not loan D2 > Q/1.85. To find the syndicate
interest rate(0.36) ,notethat the syndicated loan is an asset that pays (1+r2)
in the second period with probability II, and (1+r2)2 in the third period with
probability (1—it) •it(i.e. ,withprob (Q2 =0,Q3 =Q)).Thus, (1+p) =it
(1+r2) +it.(1—it)•(1+r2)2/(1+p),
with It1/2 and p =0.1.The solution to
this equation is r20.36. The loan ceiling is found by solving (1 .36)2D2 =Q.
Thus, we find that a syndicate will loan more (/1.85 versus /2.2) at a
better interest rate (0.36 versus 1.2). But the syndicate depends on the
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offer nothing at that rate. The risk for the syndicate is that an informal
bargain among creditors to re-lend may break down in the second period, leading
to a default rather than a re—scheduling. Recent experience with commercial
bank re-scheduling points up the tensions with re—lending. Banks with small
participation in a loan agreement try to escape with their credit intact,
relying on the larger banks to forestall default. Figure 4 on thenext page
shows this vividly with respect to the current Brazilian re-scheduling package,
where the U.S. regional banks are contributing new short-term credits at
systematically far less than their existing shares in Brazilian debt.
Other types of collective action that a syndicate might engage in include:
monitoring existing loans for compliance; enforcement of loan agreements;and
retaliatory actions in the event of non—compliance. In each of these cases, a
free-rider problem potentially exists, with resulting inefficiencies in loan
supply. Cline L5i has reported the difficulty of the commercialbank syndicates
to Peru in exercising all three of these functions, and their ultimate resortto
the IMF as a way to escape from this problem:
In March 1976 the Bermudez government sought a large balance-of-payments
loan from major U.S. banks, without a prior IMP standby agreement. The
government felt that agreeing to IMP conditions would be unacceptable
politically, although in its discussion with the banks, the government
proposed a program very much like that which might have secured IMF
support. Partly out of fear of a more leftist coup if Bermudez lost power,
the banks eventually agreed, but only after the regime demonstrated
willingness to take unpopular stabilization measures....
The program called for an initial $200 million in loans with a second
$200 million to follow after several months, contingent on government
adherence to the policy purchase. Signed only by the end of 1976, the
package soon demonstrated the frailty of such direct intervention by banks;
for reasons of data availability, technical capacity, and political
sensitivity, it proved impossible for the banks to enforce their lending
conditions, and adverse publicity for the intervention (plus its
ineffectiveness) caused the leading banks to resolve that they would not
become entangled in similar packages in the future but would rely on theFigure 4
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IMFasthe monitoring authority. (pp. 305—306)
VI. Conclusions and Extensions
This paper has suggested three areas in whichthe standard model of
international borrowing requires major revision. Inthe typical planning or
project—analysis framework, too littleattention is generally given to the
domestic budgetary implications of foreign borrowing.We have seen that in an
economy with limitations on thegovernment's ability to raise revenues, official
foreign borrowing is often less attractivethan standard calculations might
suggest. Since the shadow cost of tax revenuesis greater than 1.0, claims on
tax revenues (like amortization payments on foreignborrowing) must also given a
cost greater than 1.0.
The second area of focus was on the effects ofdefault risk, particularly
repudiation risk, on the nature of internationalloans. We found two phenomena
of great importance: the loan supply schedulebecomes upward sloping, with
eventual credit rationing, where the position of the supplyschedule depends on
the penalties of default; and various incentives areintroduced that lead to
inefficient borrowing and investment behavior by thedebtor country.
The final area of concern involved the supplyside of the credit market.
Liquidity crises were shown to result fromthe risk averse behavior of
individual lenders. Thus, we identified situationswhere the credit markets in
the aggregate would be willing to lend but inwhich each individual bank
withholds loans because of the fear that otherbanks will do so as well. No
individual bank will break the credit squeeze, but acoalition of banks acting-45-
cooperatively might well be able to restore the flow of lending. In general,
the ability to form binding coalitions among creditors allows for more
sophisticated, and ultimately more efficient loan packages. A particularly
important example is a loan agreement which guarantees a debt-rescheduling at
below—market rates in the event of an output shortfall (or other real income
loss) in the borrowing country.
Further research should explore the role of international organizations
(such as the IMF and IBRD) in light of the market imperfections we have
identified. Without doubt the IMF has an important function to play with
respect to each of the three categories of market breakdown. Its standard
country consultations already involve the review of the domestic financial
structure of borrowing countries, where a constant theme has been the intricate
connection of budget financing and foreign borrowing.
The more novel Fund involvement in recent years has come in the second and
third categories. To an increasing extent, IMF conditionality involves the
application of loan covenants to borrowing packages, for the purposes analyzed
in Section IV. In this regard Fund programs might do better to emphasize the
distribution of spending between investment and consumption rather than the
overall level of spending in the borrowing country.
The most visible role of the Fund in recent months has come in the third
category, wherein Fund cajolery has been useful in overcoming a classic panic in
theinternational loan markets. One of the great conceptual weaknesses in that
role, however, has come from the inability of analysts to distinguish
convincinglyamong the three forms of default risk discussed in Section V—46-
(solvency risk, repudiation risk, panic risk). Better, empiricallyoriented
dynamic models of international lending are stillneeded to identify the
middle—term prospects for developing country debts.—47-
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